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‘Recover it from the facts as we know them’: Practice-dependence’s Predecessors 
 
The explicit formulation of practice-dependence as a methodology in political philosophy, at 
least under that name, is relatively recent, dating back to Andrea Sangiovanni’s Justice and the 
Priority of Politics to Morality in 2008. As he formulates it, its central commitment is that “[t]he 
content, scope, and justification of a conception of [a given value] depends on the structure and 
form of the practices that the conception is intended to govern”.1 It is contrasted with practice-
independence, which rejects “the idea that the contingent, practice-mediated relations in which 
we find ourselves should change or affect the justifying reasons and premises sustaining a 
particular conception of the content and scope of [a given value]”.2 For example, luck 
egalitarianism, which requires the elimination of all and only inequalities which cannot be 
traced back to individual choice,3 is for Sangiovanni a practice-independent view since it sees 
that requirement as universally applicable. On the other hand, an account of justice which relies 
on “the notion of a ‘fair system of social cooperation’” is practice-dependent since it ties its 
principles to a particular practice.4 
As his reference to a fair system of cooperation and so justice as fairness suggests, Sangiovanni 
is one of a number of self-identifying practice-dependent theorists who are clearly inspired by 
Rawls.5 Elsewhere, Sangiovanni has quoted Rawls making the apparently strongly practice-
dependent claim that “[t]he correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of 
that thing”.6 This raises the question of the distinctiveness and interest of practice-dependence 
as a methodology. Is it anything more than a piece of Rawls interpretation? So far, its explicit 
invocation does not seem to have spread much beyond debates on global justice, where it is 
typically used to deny that the principles of egalitarian justice appropriate for the domestic 
sphere apply to relations across state borders. Practice-dependence is certainly well suited to 
                                                             
1 Andrea Sangiovanni (2008), ‘Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 16 (2):137–164, pg. 138. 
2 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pg. 139. 
3 See for example G. A. Cohen (2008), Rescuing Justice and Equality, (Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge), pg. 7 
4 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pg. 139. 
5 See for example Miriam Ronzoni (2009), ‘The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-
Dependent Account’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (3):229-256 and Laura Valentini (2011), ‘Global 
Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy 19 (4):399-418. 
6 Andrea Sangiovanni (2007), ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 
(1):3–39, pg. 5, fn. 8: John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge), pg. 
29. Sangiovanni refers to that class of theories as ‘relational’ there, but it is clear this is another term for 
what he elsewhere calls practice-dependence. Relational theories hold “that the practice-mediated 
relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope, and justification of... principles” (Global 
Justice, Reciprocity and the State, pg. 5). I will substitute practice-dependent for any uses of this sense of 
relational. 
this task. If the content of principles of justice depends on the practices they govern, then the 
fact that domestic political authority is different from any practice in the international arena 
makes it likely that the principles of justice governing the two areas will also be different. 
However, beyond these debates, the only explicit use of practice-dependence I am aware of is to 
criticize G. A. Cohen’s advocacy of a particular moral vision for a society by Miriam Ronzoni in 
her Life is not a Camping Trip.7 
In this paper, I consider the novelty of practice-dependence and its relation to various other 
methodological claims about moral and political philosophy and theory. In doing so, I hope to 
raise and illuminate various questions about method in moral and political philosophy and 
theory. In particular, I will argue that while the methodological stance adopted by explicitly 
practice-dependent theorists is appropriate, and superior to those relied on by their critics, that 
does not immunize them against criticism on at least partly methodological grounds. 
Contemporary practice-dependent theorists see themselves as operating mainly in a tradition 
inaugurated by Rawls, and when looking for antecedents or fellow travellers, tend to look either 
to the master himself or to those who have followed him.8 This is understandable, given that the 
debates they have been most active in are in a certain sense structured around arguments over 
which of the available positions has the best claim to be the guardian of the commitment to 
liberal equality Rawls made the centrepiece of his domestic theory.9 Yet by limiting their frame 
of reference in this way, practice-dependent theorists have closed themselves off from other 
work in moral and political philosophy and theory and so avoided confronting some pressing 
interpretive issues. On the one hand, I defend practice-dependence as a method, drawing on 
other pieces of moral and political philosophy which seem to me to share a methodological 
stance with explicitly practice-dependent theories to help explain the appropriateness of that 
stance. On the other, I suggest that when adopting that stance, more needs to be said about the 
practices it makes its normative recommendations depend on. These can be interpreted in a 
variety of different ways, many of which practice-dependent theorists have ignored, despite the 
implications those different interpretations would have for the sort of principles which would 
be appropriate. Practice-dependence’s opponents in the global justice literature are, I argue, 
                                                             
7 Miriam Ronzoni, ‘Life is not a Camping Trip – On the Desirability of Cohenite Socialism’, Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics, (11) 2:171 – 185.  
8 See for example Sangiovanni’s use of Nagel and Blake as foils in Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 
both of whom are also Rawls-inspired. See Michael Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and 
Autonomy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30 (3):257 – 296 and Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global 
Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33 (2):113 – 147. His discussion of Michael Walzer’s work as a form 
of a different kind of practice-dependence, relying not on institutional form but on cultural conventions 
(Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pp. 144-146) primarily uses Walzer as a foil. 
Valentini’s references to Walzer follow Sangiovanni (Global Justice and Practice-Dependence, pg. 408). 
9 See for example the egalitarian frame Sangiovanni places his argument using reciprocity to limit the 
scope of justice in Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, pg. 3. 
methodologically mistaken, but that does not mean we should uncritically adopt practice-
dependence in the forms we have thus far seen, under that name at least. Rather, we need ask 
questions about what the practices we are theorising for are actually like, and what kind of 
principles can appropriately govern them.  
This paper will proceed as follows. First, I will define practice-dependence, using examples of 
the method being deployed to make clear the otherwise potentially obscure claim that ‘the 
content, scope, and justification of a conception of a given value depends on the structure and 
form of the practices that the conception is intended to govern’. In the course of defining it, I 
explain part of its rationale and forestall a number of potential objections. Once I have defined 
practice-dependence and defended it against various objections prominent in the literature, I 
move on to consider a range of possible but largely so far ignored antecedents.10 Here, I discuss 
P. F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment and Bernard Williams’ work in both moral and 
political philosophy, as well as Christopher Kutz’s Complicity more briefly.11 I draw on Strawson 
and Williams to indicate why I think practice-dependence is an appropriate methodology, and 
then use Williams to try to undermine self-identified practice-dependence theorists’ confidence 
in their own interpretive skills. When the content, scope, and justification of a conception of a 
given value depends on the structure and form of the practices that the conception is intended 
to govern, we need accounts of the structure and form of practices, and how that shapes the 
conceptions of value that govern them. Williams and others like him seemingly have a different 
account of the structure and form of practices around us than self-identified practice-dependent 
theorists, and accordingly end up with different accounts of how they ought to be governed 
despite their acceptance of the basic methodological tenets of practice-dependence. This raises 
the question of whether Williams and other realists, or the Rawls-inspired, self-identified 
practice-dependence theorists, are right. If explicitly practice-dependent theorists are to defend 
their theories fully, they need to find ways to deal with the challenge that theorists, like 
Williams, who are more sceptical about the role of morality in political life raise. 
 
What is Practice-Dependence? 
                                                             
10 Sangiovanni refers to Williams in Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, using his theorizing of 
the ‘first political question’ (see Bernard Williams (2005), ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Argument’, 
in Bernard Williams, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn, In the Beginning was the Deed, (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton), pp. 1 – 17) to distinguish practice dependence and independence. 
11 P. F. Strawson (2008), ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, P. F. 
Strawson, (Routledge: London) 1-28, and Christopher Kutz (2000), Complicity: Ethics and Law for a 
Collective Age, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
In order to see what we can learn about practice-dependence by looking at other pieces of 
theorising with similar methodological commitments, we first need to get clear about what 
practice-dependence itself is. Here, I think it is useful to proceed by example. In particular, I 
want to look at Sangiovanni’s argument for his own ‘reciprocity-based internationalism’, the 
examples of practice-dependence he gives in Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, and 
Miriam Ronzoni’s claims about G. A. Cohen’s socialism in her Life is not a Camping Trip. The 
reason I prefer to proceed by example is to avoid confusion about what exactly is meant by 
‘depend’ when practice-dependent theorists claim that conceptions of a given value depend on 
the structure and form of the practice they are to regulate. ‘Depend’ can point to a variety of 
different relations. These range from a necessary and sufficient condition, as when the light 
switch working depends on it forming a circuit including a functioning bulb it connects to an 
electricity source, to at least the various combinations of necessity and sufficiency analysed by J. 
L. Mackie in his Causes and Conditions, in which a fire may depend on rubbish not being cleared 
even though that is only “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself 
unnecessary but sufficient for the result”.12 Given that the content of depend varies in this way, it 
seems best to understand what practice-dependent theorists mean when they say that a 
conception of a given value depends on the form and structure of what it is to govern by looking 
at how they articulate and defend conceptions of given values. 
Consider first Sangiovanni’s argument for reciprocity-based internationalism. There, he limits 
the scope of egalitarian justice to the domestic sphere by pointing to the way that those sharing 
a system of law “provide the basic collective goods necessary to protect [each other] from 
physical attack and to maintain and reproduce a stable system of property rights and 
entitlements” and so have particularly demanding duties of reciprocity towards one another.13 
Sangiovanni’s point here is that the particular character of the relation between citizens decides 
and gives content to the principles appropriate to govern that relation. He first puts pressure on 
alternative accounts of the limits of principles of egalitarian justice by showing that the features 
they point to are not necessary for or unique to domestic political authority, and that their 
presence does not track the appropriateness of egalitarian distributive norms. He then argues 
that what constitutes a fair return depends on the character of goods being provided, and that 
since fellow citizens “submitted themselves to a system of laws and social rules in ways 
necessary to sustain our life as citizens, producers, and biological beings”, making it possible for 
us to have anything at all, what they are owed is an equal share.14 The conception of justice 
Sangiovanni defends depends on the practices it is to regulate in the sense that the structure 
                                                             
12 J. L. Mackie, ‘Causes and Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, (2) 4:245 – 264, pg. 245. 
13 Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, pp. 19 – 20. 
14 Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, pp. 26 – 27.  
and form of the practice help select which abstract principles are relevant and then fill out what 
they actually require of us. As Sangiovanni rightly points out, the demands of reciprocity among 
the members of a football club are quite different from those among the members of a family.15 
We need to pay attention to the relationships that the practice a principle is to govern creates in 
order to see whether and how it should govern. 
As Sangiovanni explains elsewhere, what differentiates practice-dependence from practice-
independence is that practice-dependence does not see principles to govern particular practices 
as simple implementations of a higher order principle in the way that practice-independence 
does. He uses the example of the principle that “all human beings are of equal, ultimate, and 
general concern”.16 Practice-independent theorists sometimes interpret this as requiring 
principles of egalitarian justice with global scope, since for them the principle of basic equality 
removes any justification for inequalities which can be traced to unchosen features of people’s 
circumstances, like where and to whom they were born.17 In contrast to this practice-
independent cosmopolitanism, practice-dependent theorists allow the context in which they are 
to be applied to shape “the reasons we might have for endorsing specific principles of justice”.18 
For example, we might, with Thomas Nagel, point to the way the state claims to speak in our 
name as giving “us the standing to demand a special justification” we lack with respect to the 
global order and so distinguish the principles that ought to govern the two.19 This is even 
though we continue to affirm the principle of basic equality. The concern we owe is simply 
shaped by the relations we stand in with, so that different relations ground different forms, 
though not levels, of concern.  
The practice-independent theorist, whose “argument does not appeal, at any point, to existing 
institutions or practices”, instead sees context as shaping “courses of action we should adopt in 
implementing” principles of justice.20 They deny that relations like that between state and 
citizen shape the principles that apply to them, rather than the mechanisms available to realise 
those principles. Perhaps states with egalitarian domestic political arrangements are the best 
way to achieve the kind of globally egalitarian distribution the principle of basic equality 
mandates, given the limits imposed by human sympathy and the need for political 
accountability. It seems unlikely, but this would at least be a possible, if probably not successful, 
practice-independent argument. The difference is not between those who argue that the scope 
of egalitarian justice is limited to the domestic sphere and those who do not. Just as many 
                                                             
15 Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, pg. 27. 
16 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pg. 147. 
17 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pp. 147 – 148. 
18 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pg. 147. 
19 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pg. 148. 
20 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pg. 147. 
practice-independent theorists have argued against extending relational principles to the global 
sphere,21 practice-dependent theorists might insist that the international context is relevantly 
similar to the domestic context, or at least that it is suitable for some form of egalitarian 
justice.22 What matters is whether features of the context a given principle or set of principles 
are to govern play a role in justifying those principles beyond simply constraining the extent to 
which they can be achieved. 
This can be further illustrated if we look at Miriam Ronzoni’s explicitly practice-dependent 
critique of G. A. Cohen’s advocacy of socialism. Cohen argued that socialism’s appeal consisted of 
its realization of two principles, a luck egalitarian principle he called socialist equality of 
opportunity whose capacity for generating inequality was to be constrained by a principle of 
communal reciprocity.23 This principle of community required that “I serve you not because of 
what I can get in return by doing so but because you need or want my service, and you, for the 
same reason, serve me”.24 Cohen argued for both principles through an extended example he 
thought was both morally appealing and met the demands of the two principles, that of a 
(particularly egalitarian) camping trip. Ronzoni objects to Cohen’s principle on the grounds that 
though perhaps Cohen’s principles are attractive when thinking about how to organise camping 
trips, they are not appealing ways of organising the relations structured in other ways.25 
Camping trips are limited in time, voluntary, and aim at a shared enjoyment of “communal life 
under conditions of frugality and proximity to nature”.26 Families, though also marked by strong 
bonds of affection, are not in the same way limited in time, voluntary, or arranged around a 
thick communal conception of the good, and so the very strong norm of reciprocity Cohen 
advocates is not appropriate for them. Because they endure for whole lives rather than days, 
and have high exit costs and more extensive and deeper conflicts of interest, they need to give 
people the space to resist the demands of others on their time and resources in a way that might 
be destructive of the good of camping trips. In a family, we need a room of our own.27 What is 
appropriate for the camping trip depends on “its point and purpose and specific features of its 
constraints and participants”, just as what is appropriate for a family does, and so close 
                                                             
21 See for example Saladin Meckled-Garcia’s ‘On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice: Constructivism 
and International Agency’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16 (3):245 – 271. Meckled-Garcia’s argument 
uses an abstract requirement of principles of justice to deny that there could be global duties of justice 
rather than deriving specific principles for a specific context from attention to features of the context, and 
is therefore practice-independent. 
22 Both Miriam Ronzoni and Laura Valentini have made practice-dependent arguments for relational 
principles of global justice. See The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice and Global Justice and 
Practice-Dependence. 
23 See Cohen, G. A. (2009),Why Not Socialism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
24 Why Not Socialism, pg. 39 
25 See her Life is not a Camping Trip. 
26 Life is not a Camping Trip, pg. 179 
27 Ronzoni uses Virginia Wolff’s phrase. See Life is not a Camping Trip, pg. 178. 
attention to the structure of a practice is needed when formulating and defending principles 
intended to govern it.28 
Practice-dependence is in this sense a justificatory and epistemic strategy, a way of finding 
principles to govern a practice and drawing attention to the features that make them more 
appealing than their competitors as rules for that practice. It does not deny that there are more 
abstract principles whose details in a particular context are filled out by that strategy, though it 
may deny that those principles are of much interest themselves.29 Just as Sangiovanni points to 
a general principle of reciprocity whose demands are shaped by the specific features of the 
practice of domestic political authority it governs, Ronzoni points to the independent value of 
“the creative, inventive, multifaceted, and diverse nature of human undertakings” when 
criticizing Cohen’s socialism.30 Cohen’s requirement in his Facts and Principles that chains of 
argument must end in principles which are not argumentatively dependent on facts can easily 
be met be practice-dependent theorists then, as it can be any competent theorist.31 Fact-
dependent principles can be made fact-independent by making them conditional, or general 
principles of the sort Ronzoni and Sangiovanni refer to can be used to explain the significance of 
facts. Indeed, rather than insisting on Cohen’s empty formal requirement, it seems more useful 
to focus on the way that practice-dependence makes use of facts. Paying attention to the details 
of the camping trip Cohen uses to argue for his two socialist principles and seeing how that may 
shape the principles appropriate to govern it shows how limited their scope may be, for 
example.32 
Interpreting principles in light of the practices they are to apply to might raise the worry that 
practice-dependence lacks the critical distance necessary to subject the world as it is to proper 
moral scrutiny. Rather than demanding the abolition of practices plainly contrary to justice, the 
practice-dependent theorist suffers from a kind of adaptive preference formation, reversing the 
                                                             
28 Life is not a Camping Trip, pg. 176. 
29 In this sense, practice-dependence seems not to be a form of what David Miller (2013) calls 
contextualism. Contextualism holds “that it is the context of distribution itself that brings one or other 
principle of justice into play” and that these principles “are normatively independent of each other... not 
applications of, or derivative from, some overarching, more fundamental principle” (‘Two Ways to Think 
about Justice’, Justice for Earthlings, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge), 40 – 69, pg. 47.  
30 Life is not a Camping Trip, pg. 183. 
31 See G. A. Cohen (2003), ‘Facts and Principles’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):211–245. There has 
been much confusion about the content and significance of Cohen’s arguments in that paper. See Thomas 
Pogge (2008), ‘Cohen to the Rescue’, Ratio XXI (4):454 – 475 and (author-identifying reference 
suppressed). 
32 Ronzoni has argued in co-authored work that being able to identify which principles and judgments go 
with which contexts is a general strength of practice-dependence over practice-independence. See Ayelet 
Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, and Christian Schemmel (2011), ‘Global Social Justice: The Possibility of Social 
Justice Beyond States in a World of Overlapping Practices’, in Social Justice, Global Dynamics: Theoretical 
and Empirical Perspectives, eds., Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, Christian Schemmel, (Routledge: London), 
46 – 60. 
proper order and fitting principles to the ugly facts of the world as it is instead of demanding 
that those facts are changed to fit the principles. Practice-dependence becomes a kind of 
acquiescence in injustice, or at least a failure to explain what is just about the practices it cannot 
help but endorse.33 Beginning with an interpretation of a practice gives that practice an 
unwarranted priority over the demands of justice. Yet we might wonder how much and what 
sort of distance critique requires, and what kind is available.  
Practice-dependence certainly can critique practices, since they can always point to basic moral 
failures that need no real interpretation to condemn. For example, Sangiovanni claims that 
institutions which “depend on systematic and unmediated coercion to reproduce and sustain” 
themselves cannot be just, because justice requires that there “be some sense in which the 
terms of the institution are at least capable of being justified to all participants”, for example.34 
Nor are practices necessarily coherent, either internally or with other practices. There was 
always a tension between the official egalitarianism of the United States and the racial 
hierarchies it inscribed into its legal system, for instance. Practice-dependent theorists can use 
these tensions to argue that practices demand their own or other practices’ abolition. Ronzoni 
draws on Rawls’ arguments about the importance of the basic structure to suggest that the 
current international order’s lack of regulation places excessive burdens on domestic political 
authorities, for example, and so should be reformed.35 
It begs the question to assume that a practice’s vindication requires more distance than this. 
The practice-dependent theorist is not claiming the facts about the structure of a practice 
vindicate themselves, but that the set of rules which are to govern it will draw on its structure as 
part of their justification. They try to show, for example, that the rationale for a particular 
conception of justice depends on features of the practice it should govern, and that those 
features are absent elsewhere. Justifying the practice itself may require showing that the 
practice is permissible in terms of the larger practice it is part of, so that the justifiability of state 
sovereignty and the bounds of distributive justice it may impose depend on how practices of 
international and transnational cooperation ought to be governed. Providing a theory of how to 
govern international and transnational cooperation is well within the capability of practice-
dependent theorists though. 
Meeting the demand for critical distance seems to require ignoring any details about the 
practices the principles being theorised are to govern. This is what avoiding granting priority to 
                                                             
33 Valentini makes this claim about ‘institutionalist’ practice-dependence in her Global Justice and 
Practice-Dependence, for example. 
34 Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality, pg. 163. 
35 See The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice. 
the unfortunate facts of the matter would presumably involve, since it is the shaping of the 
content of principles by the structure of their objects that appears objectionable, an 
unwarranted compromise with the world. Assuming nothing about the object of principles may 
make the principles that are arrived at inappropriate though, and poorly defended principles 
can hardly be a sound basis for critique either. After all, Cohen’s example of the camping trip 
fails to do the justificatory work he intended it to because it is too far from the facts about our 
collective life, not because it is too close to them. The principles appropriate for camping trips 
depend in part on what camping trips are like, just as the principles appropriate for collective 
life more generally depend on what that is like. Strong norms of communal reciprocity are 
appropriate for camping trips because the voluntariness and shortness of camping trips allows 
many conflicts of interest and moral disagreements to be smoothed over or set aside. Conflicts 
of interest and moral disagreements, however, are endemic to the experience of family life, let 
alone shared citizenship, and so norms of reciprocity need to be more circumscribed. In failing 
to pay sufficient attention to what the contexts he was theorising were actually like, Cohen 
deprived his position of any critical potential by failing to adequately defend it. It is not clear 
that ignoring the world gives theories purchase on what is wrong with it then.36 Given that some 
practices will fail to meet the demands of the most minimal interpretation of whatever value it 
is proposed to govern them with, it is not clear that practice-dependence’s integration of 
features of the world into its justificatory structure means it does worse at articulating 
complaints about how things are than the available alternatives. 
 
Fellow Travellers and Forgotten Forebears 
The distinctive feature of practice-dependence is then that it apparently rightly pays close 
attention to the details, to the structure, of whichever practices its theorists are trying to 
formulate principles for. There is, as advocates of practice-dependence emphasise, good reason 
for thinking that Rawls was in this sense a practice-dependent theorist. This is true not only of 
his later work,37 but also in A Theory of Justice, where he criticizes utilitarianism for “extending 
to society the principle of choice for one man”, for treating “the decision made by the ideal 
legislator” as not “materially different from that of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximize 
                                                             
36 This is a standard feature of critiques of ideal theory in political philosophy. See Laura Valentini’s 
summary of the debate in her (2012), ‘Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map’, Philosophy Compass, 
7 (9): 654–664. 
37 See for example what he says about the four roles of political philosophy in John Rawls, ed. Erin Kelly 
(2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge), pp. 1-5, or the 
reasoning for adopting the basic structure as subject in John Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, (Columbia 
University Press: New York), pp. 257 – 288.  
his profit”.38 Utilitarianism’s problem is that it has not understood the content of the practice it 
is offering principles to regulate. Rawls and those who consciously adopt distinctively Rawlsian 
positions in contemporary debates can be safely assumed, at least in the absence of 
contradictory evidence, to have practice-dependent theories. Indeed, this makes it clear why so 
many of the objections standardly made against explicitly practice-dependent theorising were 
earlier made against Rawls. The echoes of Cohen’s complaints about Rawls’ compromises with 
human imperfection and Pogge’s demands that his principles govern global, and not just 
domestic, interactions in contemporary criticisms of practice-dependence should hardly be 
surprising.39 
This certainly makes sense of the way in which practice-dependent theorists have concentrated 
on Rawls and those who can in some sense be called his followers. That narrowness of focus, 
though, may have under-emphasised both practice-dependence’s strengths and its weaknesses. 
On the one hand, there may be resources in the canon of moral and political theory and 
philosophy that could help explicitly practice-dependent theorists to explain why their 
methodology is appropriate. On the other, by concentrating on debates which take it as read 
that political life has certain kinds of features and so presents certain kinds of problems with 
certain kinds of solutions, they may have not confronted the challenge posed by different 
accounts of politics in general and our politics in particular. In this section, I try and show that 
self-identified practice dependent theorists and their Rawlsian forebears were not the only or 
even the first to adopt the view that which principles were appropriate to regulate a practice 
depended on the details of the practice. Showing that there are other, if not explicitly, practice-
dependent theorists then allows me, in the next section, to show what we can learn about 
practice-dependence as it is from those theorists. 
We can begin with the source of the quote which forms the first part of the title of this paper, P. 
F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment. Freedom and Resentment argues against what Strawson 
calls pessimism and optimism about moral responsibility by trying to show that both 
misinterpret the practice they draw their motivation from. They “over-intellectualize the facts”, 
making demands of the practices associated with our reactive attitudes of holding each other 
and ourselves responsible that they cannot meet without destroying themselves and, with them, 
the very basis of the demands both the pessimist and optimist make.40 The optimist is a victim 
of “a characteristically incomplete empiricism, a one-eyed utilitarianism”.41  By adopting an 
                                                             
38 A Theory of Justice, pg. 27. 
39 See for example Rescuing Justice and Equality and Thomas Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (3):195 – 224. 
40 Freedom and Resentment, pg. 25. 
41 Freedom and Resentment, pg. 25. 
objective stance towards reactive attitudes like indignation and treating them as if they were 
mechanisms for bringing about good effects rather than responses warranted by particular 
forms of agency, they deny that the ideas of agency those attitudes depend on and constitute 
make sense or have purchase in the world. The pessimist, rightly feeling that “that to speak in 
terms of social utility alone is to leave out something vital in our conception of these practices”, 
searches for “some general metaphysical proposition... verified in all cases where it is 
appropriate to attribute moral responsibility”.42 Just like the optimist, they search for an 
“external, ‘rational’” justification for our practices of moral responsibility, not seeing that such a 
thing is impossible because of the mutual dependence of our sense of how it is appropriate to 
treat others and the very attitudes whose existence is being questioned by that sense.43 For 
Strawson, it is only possible to recover “a sense of what we mean... when... we speak of desert, 
responsibility, guilt, condemnation, and justice” by “attending to that complicated web of 
attitudes and feelings which form an essential part of moral life as we know it”.44 Doing more is 
not necessary. We do recover that sense “from the facts as we know them” and “do not have to 
go beyond them”.45 Again, attention to the practice is central to generating the correct principles 
for regulating it. 
Other writers on responsibility have come to similar methodological conclusions. For example, 
Christopher Kutz’s work on complicity requires us to “discard a picture of accountability that 
sees judgments of accountability as external outputs, or verdicts, of a process of moral 
evaluation, which are then used as premises in a separate process of justifying liability”.46 
Instead we should see such judgments as “elements of a unified, dynamic system of social life, 
themselves constitutive of the goods and relations they protect”.47 Unless we switch to such a 
view, the “evaluative solipsism” of some of our “commonsense principles of accountability” will 
prevent us from seeing anything more than a gap in our understanding of accountability where, 
instead, a way of dealing with involvement in others’ wrongdoing should be.48 Like Strawson, 
Kutz begins his attempt to formulate principles to regulate a given practice by interpreting the 
practice itself, believing that unless we have a proper grasp of the relations the practice creates 
and is constituted by, theories will succeed, if at all, more by luck than by judgment. In this, like 
Strawson, he is in agreement with the central thesis of practice-dependence, that ‘the content, 
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scope, and justification of a conception of a given value depends on the structure and form of the 
practices that the conception is intended to govern’. 
Nor is this a special feature of theorizing about responsibility. Consider Bernard Williams’ From 
Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value.49 There, Williams claims, among other 
things, that a conception of liberty in and from a political authority has to satisfy constraints 
which are both different from those which apply to conceptions of liberty wanted for other 
purposes and historically variable. For example, Williams denies that anarchism is a “political 
position” because as liberty is “a political value, no complaint is a complaint in liberty if it would 
apply to any political system or any state whatsoever, so the existence of the state is not itself an 
offense against or limitation on liberty”.50 Anarchism, whatever else is true about it, has a 
conception of freedom which is not appropriately sensitive to the distinctive character of 
political arrangements, centred around the idea of opposition, and so is not political.51 Equally, 
in order to make sense of the idea of a claim in liberty here and for us, a conception of liberty 
needs to rely on an idea of modernity to identify which forms of intentional action can count as 
constraining our liberty. Consequently, “competition in something like a zero-sum game” is not 
a limit on liberty now, “because competition is integral to the social system” as a whole and 
resenting it implies an alternative world so distant from ours as to be irrelevant.52 Yet we were 
once not modern, and when we were not, competition may well have been a limit on liberty. 
Williams argues that in order to provide ourselves with a serviceable idea of liberty, we have to 
pay attention to the details of the practice the idea of liberty is to be applied to. Anarchism fails 
to see what politics does, that it organises who has which freedom in a way that increases 
freedom, and so necessarily misleads us about what liberty is and how we might get more of it. 
Equally, the specific social and political structures this idea of liberty will be applied to need to 
be taken into account. If we want to regulate a “modern commercial society”, we had better not 
treat one of its fundamental features, that of competition for scarce positions, as a loss of 
liberty.53 If we do treat competition as resulting in a loss of liberty, we will end up calling for the 
abolition of the world we live in, which might be in some sense wise or even inevitable, but is 
hardly a useful way of thinking about how to try and structure it now we have it. Williams, like 
Kutz and Strawson, is urging us to make ‘the content, scope, and justification of a conception of 
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liberty depend on the structure and form of the practices that the conception is intended to 
govern’. 
This is not an unusual feature of Williams’ work on liberty or other political concepts. Williams 
consistently insisted that philosophical discussion take its orientation from the practices it aims 
at regulating. His work on ethics and its foundations, for example, emphasises that asking ‘how 
one should live’ is a first-personal question which answers to must make sense to the actors 
who ask them, and that these answers will have to be different for people in different 
circumstances. Just as he insisted that a Kantian rationality is too thin, too abstract and 
denatured, to commit us to impartiality in practical reasoning,54 he also insisted that we cannot 
sustain the integrated accounts of human nature and ethics which made it possible for Aristotle 
to see living the ethical life as “a harmonious culmination of human potentialities, recoverable 
from an absolute understanding of nature”.55 Neither of these answers to the question of how 
one should live can work for us, given that they are addressed to agents with commitments and 
a past and a future, and whose commitments include a rejection, in the forms of life they lead, of 
an Aristotelian biology. Again, attention to the practice, to the facts of how it is, that is being 
theorised – here, practical reason under the conditions of modernity – is for Williams central to 
getting the right answers to how that practice ought to operate. 
 
Conceptual Cousins and Family Disagreements 
Practice-dependence is then more widespread than its advocates’ references suggest. Kutz, 
Strawson, and Williams are not part of any Rawlsian school of political philosophy that might be 
drawn up and then claimed as practice-dependence’s natural home. Kutz and Strawson are 
concerned with principles of individual responsibility, not of social or political justice, and while 
Freedom and Resentment was anyway written before the publication of A Theory of Justice, 
neither that text nor Political Liberalism, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, or The Law of Peoples 
are referred to once in Kutz’s book-length exposition of his views.56 Williams did deal with some 
of the topics associated with Rawlsian political philosophy, but, despite his apparent 
endorsement of practice-dependence, was scathing about what he identified as its 
methodological presuppositions. His Realism and Moralism in Political Theory uses Rawls as the 
exemplar of one of the two models of political theory he rejects, for example, while the only 
discussion of Rawls in From Freedom to Liberty similarly disparages Rawls as overly 
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moralising.57 Nor does it seem likely that Kutz, Strawson, and Williams are the only non-
Rawlsian practice-dependent theorists. The self-described ‘realist’ school in contemporary 
political philosophy Williams has posthumously become one of the founding fathers of, for 
example, holds that politics must be “seriously as a particular field of human endeavour”, and 
that this constrains the kinds of recommendations that can be given about it.58 This seems 
strikingly practice-dependent. What then, if anything, does discovering these particular three 
apparently practice-dependent arguments outside of what its advocates see as its natural home 
tell us about the method and the explicit uses it has been put to? 
First, in two senses, it adds force to the rejection of complaints against practice-dependence. 
The first sense in which it strengthens practice-dependence against its critics is by adding to the 
number of pieces of apparently successful theorising seemingly guided by practice-
dependence’s prescriptions. Rejecting practice-dependence now means rejecting not just Rawls 
and the Rawlsians, but also Kutz, Strawson, and Williams. At least Williams and Strawson 
occupy significant enough places in contemporary philosophy that this ought to give critics 
some pause. Having to condemn, for example, Williams’ ‘integrity’ argument against 
utilitarianism on the same grounds and in the same terms as practice-dependent arguments for 
restricting the scope of principles of distributive justice might not be a very attractive 
prospect.59 By showing that apparently practice-dependent arguments can be successful, 
demonstrating that they have been deployed outside of debates about global justice gives us 
reason to accept them both there and elsewhere. One obvious way of assessing a method, after 
all, is to check whether the results it provides are appropriate. 
It helps to defend a method, though, if we can also explain why it is successful, not merely point 
to examples of its success. The other examples of practice-dependence are also useful in this 
regard. Part of Strawson’s point about pessimists and optimists about responsibility is that they 
rely on misinterpretations of judgments drawn from an internally complex, normatively loaded 
practice, that of attributions of responsibility. The optimist sees that we sometimes do not hold 
people responsible because there seems to be no point to it, and then infers that the justification 
of the whole practice of attributions of responsibility must be instrumental. The problem with 
this is that the practice as a whole is constitutive of the goods it protects and they have fixed on 
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Williams’ point in that argument, that the strong negative responsibility consequentialism involves is 
destructive of relations needed to sustain our sense of ourselves, is an authentically practice-dependent 
one. It relies on giving weight to distinctions we draw between forms of causal relation that 
consequentialism treats as equivalent. 
a particular part whose rationale depends on the relations it has to the other parts of the 
practice. The pessimist instead sees that the practice is not instrumental and so tries to find an 
external warrant for it.  A single external warrant though is very unlikely to match the variety of 
related justifications the many different parts of the practice require though, and will make it 
impossible for the practice to create the goods it currently does. Strawson’s account is practice-
dependent because if the practice of responsibility attribution works as a whole to give us part 
of our sense of ourselves as agents, then we need to pay attention to the practice itself, not least 
because our judgments about that practice themselves rely on the normative resources it 
provides. 
Assuming Strawson is right about how practices of responsibility attribution work, this gives us 
a reason to adopt practice-dependent theories of responsibility attribution. Responsibility 
attribution is an internally complex, normatively loaded practice which constitutes the good it 
protects. The successful operation of one part of the practice may depend on another part of the 
practice which operates in a quite different way, and so any one part’s normativity may easily 
be misunderstood if considered in isolation. Recall that earlier I suggested that practice-
dependence can be useful in identifying the features of a case a judgment about it is responding 
to. Observing that camping trips have a certain form, that they are limited in time, voluntary, 
and presuppose commitment to thick, specific values for their duration, helps us understand 
why certain principles governing them is appealing and why those principles may not have 
purchase outside that context. Internally complex, normatively loaded practices like 
responsibility attribution not only require attention to the appropriate characterisation of the 
situation that a judgment is drawn from, but also to the other situations the practice in question 
might generate. It is not just that when we adopt Strawson’s objective attitude to someone that 
we are responding to the pointlessness of holding them responsible here and now, but that we 
are also marking the way that in a different situation, it might be appropriate to hold them 
responsible. The point of something may not be just what it is, but also what it is not, and we 
may need to understand both in order to draw appropriate conclusions about it. 
Internally complex, normatively loaded practices like responsibility attribution give us a further 
reason for using practice-dependence when generating theories about how they should operate, 
then. Whenever we rely on a judgment about a case as evidence for or against some other 
judgment or a principle, we may need to think about the features of that case, the practice that it 
is embedded in, so as to see how those features may constrain that judgment, how that the 
judgment responds to them. When using a judgment about cases from internally complex, 
normatively loaded practices, it is not only the features of that case which the judgment 
responds to, but also the role that the case plays in the practice, its relations to other parts of the 
practice. These also constrain the judgment, make it context-relative. Practice-independence’s 
failure to consider the contexts of the judgments it must also use to support its more abstract 
claims is then doubly damned when those judgments concern internally complex, normatively 
loaded practices. It is not just that they risk misapplying those judgments, but that 
misapplication will undermine the very basis of the judgment itself. 
How significant this is depends on how many of our practices are internally complex and 
normatively loaded. Given that humans are cultural animals, who in groups of varying size 
create various interlocking systems of meaning that shape their interpretations of the world, it 
seems likely that many, if not most, of them are. To see this, consider again Cohen’s camping trip 
example. It seems likely that our reasons for going on camping trips, for regarding camping trips 
as worthwhile, depend in part on how the rest of our lives are. Medieval peasants did not, so far 
as I know, deliberately set out to spend their spare time ‘living communally under conditions of 
frugality and proximity to nature’. It is the contrast between an urban life, marked by comfort 
sustained in a certain sort of mutual indifference, and the need to work together in 
circumstances where we are no longer shielded from our natural smallness and insignificance 
that makes camping appealing.60 The attraction of camping and of the principles that ought to 
govern it depend on what it is not as much as on what it is. The relation between camping trips 
and other activities structures the reasons for going camping and how we ought to behave when 
we go camping, just as the availability of going camping presumably structures the reasons for 
doing other things and how we ought to behave when we do them. Another way of putting this 
would be to say that going camping is part of an internally complex, normatively loaded practice 
we could call ‘leisure activities in conditions of (western) modernity’. This practice seems itself 
part of a broader practice, ‘life in conditions of (western) modernity’. Consequently, if we are 
going to use judgments about camping trips or indeed many other activities we often engage in 
to illustrate or support our arguments, particularly if the judgment is being generalised, we 
should consider the way that camping trips fit into a broader pattern of relations. 
The fact that humans are reflective as well as cultural creatures suggests not just that many of 
the practices our activities are part of are likely to be internally complex and normatively 
loaded, but that they are likely to be part of one particular practice, the practice of constituting 
ourselves as agents. By reflecting on our choices, by understanding what we are doing in a 
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certain range of ways, we shape our own agency.61 This is Strawson’s point in Freedom and 
Resentment. Of course, we do not shape it from nothing, any more than parents shape a child’s 
personality from nothing. Still, operating within various constraints, the way our cultural 
practices shape our choices and their meaning also shapes the kinds of agent we are and can be 
by describing the range of choices available to us in various particular ways. In Williams’ 
example, it seems there was a time when it was straightforward to think of nature itself as 
teleological and humans as occupying a privileged place within it. The fact that we struggle to 
understand ourselves in that way is a change in our conception of ourselves related to how we 
understand what our reasons for doing certain things are, itself produced by changes in what 
we think is possible for beings like us, particularly in comparison to other beings.62 If our 
activities are standardly implicated in our constitution of ourselves as agents, then they will 
standardly be part of an internally complex, normatively loaded practice. If we want to use 
judgments about our activities to support claims we make in political and moral philosophy, 
then, we will often benefit from being clear about the role those activities play in our self-
constitution. This is only more true of moral judgments, which are likely to be particularly 
centrally connected to our conception of ourselves since they govern our relations with other, 
apparently similar, agents. We may be vulnerable to the same treatment, after all. 
Let us set aside what the non-Rawlsian examples of practice-dependence teach us about our 
reasons for adopting that method, though, and move to what they might tell us about the uses it 
can be put to. Here, Williams’ work is particularly helpful. As we have already seen, Williams 
was notably hostile to much Rawlsian political philosophy despite sharing a general 
methodological stance with it. He and other advocates of the realist critique of contemporary 
analytical political philosophy may not have been or be fully aware of the extent to which they 
share methodological perspectives with Rawlsians, and so there may be some confusion on both 
sides about what differentiates them. Still, it would odd to see them as in agreement. There are 
often significant differences between what they prescribe for political actors and institutions. It 
is difficult to imagine Williams condemning welfare state capitalism in the strongly moralised 
terms that Rawls did, for example.63 Those differences call for explanation, given the apparent 
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similarity of methodological commitments, and in doing so, suggest one of the weaknesses of 
contemporary Rawlsianism. 
I have argued elsewhere at length that the difference between contemporary Rawlsianism and 
Williams’ form of political realism is Rawlsianism’s greater confidence in the tools of 
philosophical reasoning as mechanisms for solving the various different conflicts which 
characterise the political as a distinct sphere.64 There, I suggest that each side to the dispute 
might sensibly learn something from the other, that there are both authentic political questions 
realists tend to ignore because of their philosophical cast and properly philosophical questions 
Rawlsians sometimes raise when politics exists because we cannot agree on answers to them. 
Realists, though, presumably at least partly because they are articulating dissatisfactions with 
an apparently dominant paradigm, have been fairly clear about how their interpretation of the 
practice of politics differs from that of the moralism they see in most contemporary analytical 
political philosophy. It “naturally construes conflictual political thought in society in terms of 
rival elaborations of a moral text”, its assumption that its audience are able to enact whatever it 
recommends revealing its disinterest in universals of politics like power and powerlessness.65 
Politics is for realists about conflict and its management, the first political question of the 
provision of order.66 Order cannot be provided by philosophical arguments alone, because those 
arguments are neither concrete enough nor capable of resolving differences whose roots lie 
elsewhere. Historical, institutional, and psychological resources will instead need to be 
mobilised to legitimate, to make sense of, contemporary power structures and their claim to 
authority over their subjects.67 The political practices contemporary analytical political theory 
hopes to govern have, for realists, a structure that makes it impossible for the kinds of claims 
Rawls and his followers make to have purchase on them. Philosophy is not the answer to the 
questions politics poses, or at least not philosophy of the sort most political philosophers do. 
This is a problem for self-identified practice-dependent theorists. It suggests that for all their 
apparent attention to the structure and form of the practices they are concerned with, they have 
made a fundamental mistake about the kinds of conceptions of values which can govern them.68 
The abstract, often philosophical, resources self-identified practice-dependent theorists point to 
are too remote or controversial to hold the allegiance of the citizens political explanation should, 
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in the end, be for. It is far from clear that many contemporary Western citizens could think of 
their states as creating and sustaining them in the sense that Sangiovanni suggests as the basis 
of their distributive obligations to each other, at least not without those states becoming 
considerably more encompassing and less liberal, for example. Rousseau after all thought that 
“the total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community” required 
“changing human nature”, and that most nations in Europe had grown so “incorrigible” as to be 
incapable of making that change.69 Relying on value of ‘the creative, inventive, multifaceted, and 
diverse nature of human undertakings’ to buttress your defence of liberalism will not do either, 
since it will hardly count as an answer to the clamouring of those committed to those various 
undertakings for the special treatment they believe themselves entitled to, including rights over 
their competitors.70 Equally, treating realist concerns about whether moral ideals can serve as 
the foundation of coercive political order, as both Ronzoni and Valentini do, as worries about 
whether their implementation is feasible is hardly an adequate response.71 
Sangiovanni has tried to argue that practice-dependence gives pride of place to the realist 
question of “the exercise and command of political power”, avoiding the confusion between it 
and questions of moral philosophy many contemporary political philosophers fall victim to.72 
However, not adopting the view from nowhere, accepting that the features of the practice which 
are being theorised are relevant for the justification of principles to govern it, is not the same as 
taking the particular perspective on what political problems are and how they can be solved 
that characterises realism. If realism is anything, it is the denial of Rawlsianism’s most 
fundamental methodological commitment, that “formulatting idealized... conceptions of society 
and person connected” with the ideas which together characterise “society as a fair system of 
cooperation” are “essential to finding a reasonable political conception”.73 The issue between 
Rawlsians and realists is not whether politics is prior to morality, but how much morality 
politics needs.  Yet self-identifying practice-dependent theorists have done little to defend the 
way they integrate their interpretations of practices into their broader theories, as opposed to 
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defending integrating interpretations of practices into their theories at all. Yet as we have seen, 
there are other theorists who agree that moral and political philosophy and theory should be 
practice-dependent, yet disagree about how it should be practice-dependent. Self-identified 
practice-dependent theorists are not the only epistemically respectable theorists around, and a 
full defence of their work will mean doing more than pointing out the justificatory difficulties of 
ignoring the world. 
By pressing self-identified practice-dependent theorists in this way, I do not intend to suggest 
that they are incapable of providing the defence I claim they need. As things stand, by 
addressing themselves to theorists who mainly deny the relevance of practice to moral and 
political theorising, they have largely side-stepped issues of what practices are actually like and 
which sorts of principles are appropriate for them. In particular, they seem to have said nothing 
that could be used to defend their theories against alternatives we could group together under 
the banner of realism. Observing that they have side-stepped these issues and not yet said 
anything about them, of course, does not mean that they must side-step these issues and can say 
nothing about them. It is simply that as things stand, they are exposed to a powerful critique. 
That critique is not methodological in the sense that it disagrees about the dependence of 
conceptions of values on the practices they are to govern. It is methodological in a different 
sense, in that it queries the canons of interpretation which underlie self-identifying practice-
dependence and questions the results they generate. If we are to be practice-dependent 
theorists, as I have argued we should, then we need to look hard and carefully at the practices 
our principles will end up depending on. They may, like realists have argued, not be as 
amenable to being governed by philosophy as self-identified practice-dependent theorists 
assume.  
